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  • Loadrunner的Tuxedo脚本分析,基本流程和基本函数介绍

    #include "lrt.h"
    #include "replay.vdf"

    vuser_init()
    {


     //=================================================================================================================
     // 第一个交易
     
        // 1.设置变量组: Sets a list of environment variables.
     lrt_set_env_list(env_allow_array);

        // 2.从配置文件读取环境变量:  Adds variables to the environment from a file.
     lrt_tuxreadenv("C:\\Program Files\\test\\test8\\etc\\tuxedoenv.ini", "TUXCOMM");

        //事务开始
     lr_start_transaction("01_login");

        // 3. Modifies an existing environment value or adds a value to the environment.
     lrt_tuxputenv("ULOGPFX=c:\\log\\330100-300302");

     lr_think_time(25);

        // 4.分配空间: Allocates a new buffer.
     // The lrt_tpalloc function allocates a new buffer and returns a pointer to a buffer of specified type. Since some buffer types
     // require initialization before they can be used, lrt_tpalloc initializes a buffer after it is allocated, before it is returned.
     data_0 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65000);

     // 5.进行初始化: Initializes an existing FML buffer.
       //  注意:  data_0 在replay.vdf 中已经被定义,同时在此处被初始化,初始化后,就可以向里面添加field-value对了.
     lrt_Finitialize32((FBFR32*)data_0);

     // 6.向data_0中加field-value对,就是传给后台tuxedo服务的数据:
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=167772364", "value=330100", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=167772373", "value=10.253.1.138", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=167772374", "value=000000000000", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=167772375", "value=1", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=167772422", "value=300302", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=167772423", "value=000000", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);

       // 7. 分配空间给data_1: Allocates a new buffer.
     data_1 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65000);


     // 8. 使用lrt_tpcall 调用服务,发送的数据是data_0,服务器的返回信息保存在data_1中.
     // lrt_tpcall Sends a service request and awaits its reply.
        // int lrt_tpcall ( char *svc, char *idata, long ilen, char **odata, long *olen, long flags );

     // svc  Requested service (can be parameterized). 
     // idata  Data portion of the request. 
     // ilen  Length of request data to send. 
     // odata  Reply data. 
     // olen  Length of reply data. 
     // flags  Valid flags: TPNOTRAN- SVC will not be performed on behalf of caller's transaction,
     //    TPNOCHANGE - buffer type of reply data is not allowed to change, TPNOBLOCK - request not sent if blocking condition exists,
     //    TPNOTIME - caller immune to blocking timeouts, TPSIGRSTRT - any interrupted system calls are re-issued after lrt_tpcall. 

     tpresult_int = lrt_tpcall("new_css_Login",
      data_0,
      0,
      &data_1,
      &olen,
      0);
     /* Returned FML32 buffer 1 */


     // 9.使用lrt_save32_fld_val 从服务器返回信息中获取需要的数据:
     // The lrt_save32_fld_val function saves the current value of an FML32 buffer to a parameter specified by paramName.
     // lrt_save32_fld_val(fbfr, "id=xxxx", 0, "parameter");
     // lrt_save32_fld_val(fbfr, "name=xxxx", 0, "parameter");
     lrt_save32_fld_val((FBFR32*)data_1,"id=167772363",0,"returnValue") ;
        // print
     lr_output_message("返回值:%s",lr_eval_string("{returnValue}") ) ;

        // 10.如果出错,则停止事务Aborts the current transaction if the previous Tuxedo function resulted in an error.
     lrt_abort_on_error();


     //11.释放之前的空间和连接:
     // The lrt_tpfree function frees a buffer that was previously obtained by either lrt_tpalloc or lrt_tprealloc.
     lrt_tpfree(data_0);
     lrt_tpfree(data_1);
     // The lrt_tpterm function removes a client from a System/T application.
     // If the client is in transaction mode, then the transaction is rolled back.
     lrt_tpterm();


        // 第一个交易已经完成.
        //=================================================================================================================

     // 进行第二个交易:
     
        // 其他的操作和第一轮操作类似:
        //分配新的空间
     data_0 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65535);
     // 重新初始化:
     lrt_Finitialize32((FBFR32*)data_0);
     //设置数据
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554633", "value=5084013", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554637", "value=9901", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554640", "value=1", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554642", "value=920041", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=42755520", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=67109070", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=67109071", "value=1", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=67109076", "value=Q", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
        // 为返回值分配空间:
     data_1 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65535);
     // 调用服务:
     tpresult_int = lrt_tpcall("csi_01",
      data_0,
      0,
      &data_1,
      &olen,
      0);
     /* Returned FML32 buffer 2 */
     lrt_abort_on_error();

    // 释放
     lrt_tpfree(data_0);
     lrt_tpfree(data_1);
     lrt_tpterm();


       // 第二个交易完成
       //=================================================================================================================

     lr_end_transaction("01_login", LR_AUTO);


     lr_start_transaction("05_select");

       
     // 第三个及以后的所有交易,都与之前的交易类似:
     //=================================================================================================================

     lr_think_time(55);
     data_0 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65535);
     lrt_Finitialize32((FBFR32*)data_0);
     
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=1101360", "value=1", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=1101360", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=1101360", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=1101360", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554633", "value=5084013", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554637", "value=9901", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554640", "value=1", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=33554642", "value=110001", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);

     data_1 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65535);
     tpresult_int = lrt_tpcall("csi_01",
      data_0,
      0,
      &data_1,
      &olen,
      0);
     /* Returned FML32 buffer 3 */
     lrt_abort_on_error();

     lrt_tpfree(data_0);
     lrt_tpfree(data_1);
     lrt_tpterm();


    //=================================================================================================================

     data_0 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65535);
     lrt_Finitialize32((FBFR32*)data_0);
     
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=1101225", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=1101307", "value=0", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);
     lrt_Fadd32_fld((FBFR32*)data_0, "id=168873390", "value=", LRT_END_OF_PARMS);

     data_1 = lrt_tpalloc("FML32", "", 65535);
     tpresult_int = lrt_tpcall("csi_01",
      data_0,
      0,
      &data_1,
      &olen,
      0);
     /* Returned FML32 buffer 11 */
     lrt_abort_on_error();
     
     lrt_tpfree(data_0);
     lrt_tpfree(data_1);
     lrt_tpterm();
     lr_end_transaction("05_select", LR_AUTO);

    //=================================================================================================================

     return 0;
    }

    Action()
    {
     return 0;
    }

    vuser_end()
    {
     return 0;
    }

    replay.vdf

    #ifndef TUXVDF_H
    #define TUXVDF_H
    char* data_0;
    char* data_1;

    /* Returned FML32 buffer 1
    field: "id=33554633", "occurrence=0", "value=5084013"
    field: "id=33554637", "occurrence=0", "value=9901"
    Reply buffer */

    #endif /* TUXVDF_H */

    loadrunner wdiff对比返回结果,分析异同,进行关联
    也可以监测服务器收到的和返回的信息,分析

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  • 原文地址:https://www.cnblogs.com/me115/p/2001000.html
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