Mental models represent explicitly what is true, but not what is false.
不同的模型意味着不同的可能性，从这个前提上来说。没有错误的心智模式。心智模式是不会错的，只有对的心智模式，没有错误的心智模式。
The greater the number of models that a task elicits, and the greater the complexity of individual models, the poorer performance is. Resoners focus on a subset of the possible models of multiple-model problems – often just a single model – and are led to erroneous conclusions and irrational decisions.
在同一个任务中间，模型越复杂，参与的模型越多，表现就越差。这也可以很好的解释很多事情，往往在商业上面获胜的人，不是满腹经纶系统化思考的人，而是把简单事情重复做到极致的人。添高危打网球的视频也告诉我们，为什么那个老太太可以20分钟有很好的表现？就是因为她只采取了很简单的系统，很轻松的心智模式。
Mental models are strongly conservative: left unchallenged, they will cause us to see what we have always seen: the same needs, the same opportunities, the same results. And because we see what our mental models permit us to see, we do what our mental models permit us to do.
心智模式是非常保守的，完全没有任何挑战的，他让我们看到我们经常时常看到的、感到同样的需求、看到同样的机会、收获同样的结果。因为我只会看到我们的心智允许我们看到的，做我们的心智允许我们去做的。
Because mental models “limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting,”
因为心智模式把我们限制在熟悉的思考和行动方式中。人们去做一个计划，却还是按照过去的心智模式，这让他们的计划看上去好像电影的剧本。
According to the theory of mental models, we are saving all perceived stimulation and observations to our memory in the form of abstract models , which are cognitive constructs formed by basic sensory information, and are combined with already saved information. Prof. Jay Wright Forrester defined a mental model as: ”The image of the world around us, which we carry in our head, is just a model. Nobody in his head imagines all the world, government or country. He has only selected concepts, and relationships between them, and uses those to represent the real system.
根据心智模式的理论，我们保存素有的接收到的刺激与观察结果到我们的记忆中间，并且建立起来抽象的模式。我们通过最原始的感官刺激去认知上建构他们，同时还与已经存下来的信息混合在一起。PROF 这样定义心智模式：我们身边世界的图像，在我们脑子里面的，只是一个模型。没有人在脑子里面建构出所有的世界，政府或者国家。他只是选择他们之间的概念、关系，然后用这些去代表整个系统。
The term is believed to have been originated by Kenneth Craik in his 1943 book The Nature of Explanation. After the early death of Craik in a bicycle accident, the idea was not elaborated on until much later. Before Craik,Georges-Henri Luquet had already developed this idea to some extent: in his seminal book Le dessin enfantin(Children’s Drawings), published in 1927 by Alcan, Paris, he argued that children obviously construct internal models, a view that influenced, among others, Jean Piaget.
Two books, both titled Mental Models, appeared in 1983 [7] One was by Philip Johnson-Laird, a professor atPrinceton University‘s Department of Psychology. The other was a collection of articles edited by Dedre Gentnerand Albert Stevens. The first line of this book helps explain the idea further: “One function of this chapter is to belabor the obvious; people’s views of the world, of themselves, of their own capabilities, and of the tasks that they are asked to perform, or topics they are asked to learn, depend heavily on the conceptualizations that they bring to the task.” See Mental Models (Gentner-Stevens book).
这个章节的一个重要功能就是讨论人们对于世界的看法，对于他自己和他们自己的能力，还有对他们他们被要求去做的任务，他们被要求去学习的内容，深深的取决于他们进入这个任务中间的概念。
Since then there has been much discussion and use of the idea in human-computer interaction and usability by people such as Donald Norman and by Steve Krug in his book Don’t Make Me Think. Walter Kintsch and Teun A. van Dijk, using the term situation model (in their book Strategies of Discourse Comprehension, 1983), showed the relevance of mental models for the production and comprehension of discourse.
Each model represents a possibility. Its structure corresponds to the structure of the world, but it has symbols for negation, probability, believability, and so on. Models that are kinematic or dynamic unfold in time to represent sequences of events.
每一个模式意味着一个可能性：模式的架构与世界的架构相呼应。但是他拥有关于否定、可能性、可信度等等一系列的标志。心智模型们是动态的或者动力的及时打开去代表一系列的事件。
Models are iconic insofar as possible, that is, their parts and relations correspond to those of the situations that they represent. They underlie visual images, but they also represent abstractions, and so they can represent the extensions of all sorts of relations. They can also be supplemented by symbolic elements to represent, for example, negation.
模式尽可能的去隐喻所有东西：也就是说，模式的部分和关系对应着他们那些他们代表的部分。他们通过图像展现，但是他们同时代表着抽象的东西，所以他们可以代表各种各样的延伸的关系。他们还可以被符号化的元素所填补去代表，比如说否定。
Models explain deduction, induction, and explanation. In a valid deduction, the conclusion holds for all models of the premises. In an induction, knowledge eliminates models of possibilities, and so the conclusion goes beyond the information given. In an abduction, knowledge introduces new concepts in order to yield an explanation.
模式可以解释演绎，归纳和诠释：在一个有效的演绎中，结论作为所有系统的前提。在一个归纳中，知识消除有可能性的模式，所以结论就会在给予的信息之上。在一个外展中间，知识引入新的概念去产生一个解释。
The theory gives a ‘dual process’ account of reasoning. System 1 constructs initial models of premises and is restricted in computational power, i.e., it cannot carry out recursive inferences. System 2 can follow up the consequences of consequences recursively, and therefore search for counterexamples, where a counterexample is a model of the premises in which the conclusion does not hold.
模式理论给予一个推论的双处理流程账户：系统1构建了一个关于初始数据的模型，严格的按照计算的方式来运作。也就是说，他不能实现回归的推论。系统2泽可以根据随之而来的结果做回归，这样来找到反例，在这些反例中间，初始数据的不能得到这个结论的。
The greater the number of alternative models needed, the harder it is: we take longer and are more likely to err, especially by overlooking a possibility，In the simulation of a sequence of events, the later in the sequence that a critical event occurs, the longer it will take us to make the inference about it.
可替代的模型数目越多，表现就越糟糕： 我们花更长的时间，而我们也更容易在模拟系列事件中出错。尤其是通过忽略了可能性。在系列中间，重要事件发生得越晚，我们就要花越长的时间获得推论。
The principle of truth: mental models represent only what is true, and accordingly they predict the occurrence of systematic and compelling fallacies if inferences depend on what is false. An analogous principle applies to the representation of what is possible rather than impossible, to what is permissible rather than impermissible, and to other similar contrasts.
真理原则：心智模式只会呈现真实的东西：同样的，他们展示系统性的事件和强制性的错误当推论是来自于错误的东西。模式体现里的类似的原则是：有可能的高于不可能的，能允许的高于不被允许的。
The meanings of terms such as ‘if’ can be modulated by content and knowledge. For example, our geographical knowledge modulates the disjunction: Jay is in Stockholm or he is in Sweden. Unlike most disjunctions, this one yields a definite conclusion: Jay is in Sweden.
条件比如说“如果”的意义能通过内容和数据来调整：比如说，我们的地理知识能够调整这个逻辑命题。JAY不是在斯德哥尔摩（瑞典首都）就是在瑞典。不想大部分的二选一命题，这个会产出一个确定的结论，JAY在瑞典。
We should also add that the theory accounts for the informality of arguments in science and daily life, whereas logic is notoriously of little help in analyzing them. If people base such arguments on mental models, then there is no reason to suppose that they will lay them out like the steps of a formal proof. The theory of mental models, however, is not a paragon. It is radically incomplete; and it is likely to have problems and deficiencies. Proponents of rule theories have accused it of every conceivable shortcoming from blatant falsehood to untestability. It postulates that human reasoners can in principle see the force of counterexamples, and indeed people are able to construct them — a competence that is beyond the power of formal rule theories to explain. The model theory may well be overturned by counterexamples predicted by a superior theory. In which case, it will at least have had the virtue of accounting for its own demise.
我们还应该加上说，这个理论基于科学和日常生活非正式的论点，在这个领域，逻辑分析没有什么帮助，也没有什么好名声。如果人们基于这样一个心智模式的论点，他们就没有任何理由支持他们有必要安排形式化的证据。关于心智模式的理论并不是一个完美范例。他激进所以不完整，他也有问题和抗议。逻辑理论的支持者们因为他们的每一个可想到的缺点——从喧嚣的错误到不可测。他假设理性人可以原则性的看到反例的力量，而且人们还可以构建他们。这是一个逻辑理论无法解释的能力。心智模式理论也许会被更高级理论提出的反例来推翻。在这种情况下，他至少可以有用处来解释他自己的消逝。